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Abstract 
This study contributes to the current debate on how privacy concerns can and should be integrated into 
merger analysis. First, I contend that while competition authorities increasingly account for the role of 
personal data as a source of market power and entry barriers, privacy-related consumer harm still 
remains a blind spot in merger analysis. Second, I discuss how this analytical gap can be filled by 
mapping out three potential theories of privacy-related consumer harm: namely, privacy as an element 
of product quality, privacy as a feature of consumer choice, and privacy as non-monetary price. Third, 
and this is my major claim and contribution, this study proposes willingness-to-pay studies in the form 
of conjoint analysis as a methodology that enables competition authorities to quantify privacy-related 
consumer harm in monetary terms. In a fourth section, this study discusses potential objections to this 
approach. In so doing, it shows that the widespread opposition against the incorporation of privacy into 
merger analysis is based on a ‘privacy fallacy’. This ‘privacy fallacy’ derives from the erroneous 
assumption that deteriorations in the level of privacy protection as a consequence of a merger 
automatically amount to a breach of data-protection rules which should be addressed by data protection 
authorities, but which do not constitute an antitrust concern.  
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I. Introduction 
One day in August 2016, an identical message simultaneously popped up on the cell phone screens of 
millions of WhatsApp users. Notifying the users of a change in WhatsApp’s privacy policy, it required 
them to opt out within 30 days of their personal data being shared with Facebook. Two years earlier, the 
FTC1 and the EU Commission2 had cleared the merger between Facebook and WhatsApp, despite the 
numerous concerns aired by privacy and consumer groups. Back then, the EU Commission had actually 
assessed the possibility of the merged entity combining Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s user data after the 
consummation of the merger. It had, however, concluded that the merged entity would lack the 
technological ability and incentives to merge the datasets of the two companies.3  
Rather than the final word, the Commission’s decision to clear the merger has been the starting point of 
the Facebook/WhatsApp saga. A few months after the change in its privacy policy, the Italian 
Competition Authority imposed a 3 million EUR fine on WhatsApp for having forced its users to share 
their personal data with Facebook.4 Likewise, the Commission seemed extremely unhappy about the 
unforeseen change in WhatsApp’s privacy policy, and recently imposed a 110 Million EUR fine on 
Facebook for having provided incorrect information about the technical feasibility of the matching of 
both firms’ datasets during the merger proceedings.5  
Against this backdrop, one can perceive the Facebook/WhatsApp merger as a natural experiment; an 
experiment which shows that, less than two years after the clearance of the merger, the merged entity 
behaved in a fundamentally different way from what the Commission had forecast in its merger analysis. 
This unexpected outcome raises a number of questions: Did the EU Commission get its analysis of the 
Facebook/WhatsApp merger wrong? What can explain the EU Commission’s failure to foresee the 
change in Facebook/WhatsApp privacy policy? And, more generally, what is the appropriate role of 
concerns about data and privacy in competition analysis?  
This study aims to contribute to the current debate on the intersection between big data, privacy and 
antitrust by answering these questions in reverse order. First, I contend that, paradoxically, the academic 
debate on the role of personal data in antitrust lags behind the actual enforcement practice of EU and 
US competition authorities. Whereas there is an ongoing heated debate amongst antitrust commentators 
as to whether personal data should be considered in competition law enforcement, competition 
authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have already been assessing the competitive role of personal 
data for quite some time. The real question is therefore ‘how’, rather than ‘whether’, competition 
authorities should deal with personal data in their analysis (I). Second, based on a reassessment of the 
Commission’s Facebook/WhatsApp decision, I posit that the fundamental problem with the current 
approach to data-driven mergers is that it largely ignores potential detrimental effects of the 
concentration of personal data on consumers. One important reason for this privacy blind spot of merger 
analysis is that the antitrust literature and competition authorities have so far omitted to articulate a clear 
                                                   
1  The FTC cleared the merger, but required under its consumer protection competence both parties to honour their privacy 
policies post-merger Federal Trade Commission, ‘Letter From Jessica L. Rich, Director of the Federal Trade Commission 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, to Erin Egan, Chief Privacy Officer, Facebook, and to Anne Hoge, General Counsel, 
WhatsApp Inc.’ (2014) <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/04/letter-jessica-l-rich-director-federal-trade-
commission-bureau-consumer> accessed 12 December 2016. 
2  European Commission, Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/Whatsapp 3 October 2014. 2014/C 417/02. 
3  
ibid [184] – [186]. 
4  Autorità garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, ‘WhatsApp fined for 3 Million Euro for having forced its users to share 
their personal data with Facebook’ (2017) <http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/2380-whatsapp-fined-for-3-
million-euro-for-having-forced-its-users-to-share-their-personal-data-with-facebook.html> accessed 14 May 2017. 
5  European Commission, ‘Press Release: Commission fines Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information about 
WhatsApp takeover’ (18 May 2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm> accessed 29 May 2017. 
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and workable theory of privacy-related consumer harm. I therefore discuss different ways of framing a 
privacy-related theory of antitrust harm (II). Third, I suggest that willingness-to-pay studies in the form 
of conjoint analysis constitute the most appropriate methodological tool for competition authorities to 
quantify privacy-related price increases in the context of market definition and the analysis of consumer 
harm (III). By discussing potential objections to the use of conjoint analysis to account for privacy harm 
in merger control, I also uncover a fundamental misconception that underlies the current academic 
discussion about the role of privacy for competition analysis (IV).  
This study, using the methodological tool of conjoint analysis, offers a workable proposal as to ‘how’ 
competition authorities could account for the adverse effects of a decrease in privacy protection on 
consumers as a consequence of a merger. It also suggests that consumers can be harmed by such a 
deterioration of data protection, even if it is in line with data protection rules. This insight casts doubt 
upon the widely shared assumption that deteriorations in the level of privacy protection resulting from 
a merger automatically amount to a breach of data-protection rules, and are thus adequately addressed 
by data protection rather than competition law. Showing that this ‘privacy fallacy’ underlies the 
widespread opposition to incorporating privacy considerations into competition analysis, it also provides 
an answer to the question as to ‘whether’ competition law should include privacy and data protection in 
its analysis. This answer is a clear ‘yes’. 
II. The role of personal data in antitrust analysis 
‘Big data’6 has become a buzzword in antitrust circles, catching the attention of policy makers,7 
enforcers,8 practitioners,9 and academics10 alike. A fierce controversy has sparked in the antitrust 
                                                   
6  ‚Big Data’ has commonly been characterized by four ‚V’s: the volume of data; the velocity at which data is collected, used, 
and disseminated; the variety of information aggregated; and finally the value of the data. Each ‚V‘ has increased 
significantly over the past decade.‘ Stucke, Maurice E. and Allen P Grunes, Big data and competition policy (Oxford 
University Press 2016) 16; OECD, ‘Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being: Interim Synthesis Report’ (2014) 
11. 
7  European Data Protection Supervisor, Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay between Data 
Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy: Preliminary Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor (2014). 
8  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘The commercial use of consumer data: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
(2015); German Monopoly Commission (Monopolkommission), ‘Hauptgutachten XX (2012/2013)’ (2014); 
Bundeskartellamt/Autorité de la Concurrence, ‘Competition Law and Data’ (2016); Bruno Lasserre, ‘Personal Data - Will 
Competition Law Collide with Privacy? Le point de vue de l'Autorité Française de la Concurrence’, Concurrences - New 
frontiers of antitrust 2013 ; German Monopoly Commission (Monopolkommission), ‘Special Report 68: Competition 
policy: The challenge of digital markets’ . 
9  Damien Geradin and Monika Kuschewsky, ‘Competition Law and Personal Data: Preliminary Thoughts on a Complex Issue’ 
2013(2) Concurrences 14; Pamela J Harbour, ‘Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour in the Matter 
of Google/DoubleClick F.T.C. File No. 071-0170’; Harbour, ‘Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones 
Harbour in the Matter of Google/DoubleClick F.T.C. File No. 071-0170’ (n 9). 
10  Pamela J Harbour and Tara I Koslove, ‘Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets’ 
(2010) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 769. Allen P Grunes, ‘Another Look at Privacy’ (2013) 20(4) George Mason Law Review, 
1107; Spencer Weber Waller, ‘Antitrust and Social Networking’ (2012) 90 North Carolina Law Review 1771; James C 
Cooper, ‘Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and Subjectivity’ (2013) 20(4) George Mason 
Law Review, 1129; Nathan Newman, ‘Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data’ (2014) 31 Yale 
J. on Reg. 401; Darren S Tucker and Hill B Wellford, ‘Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data’ [2014] Antitrust Source, 
American Bar Association; D. D Sokol and Roisin E Comerford, ‘Antitrust and Regulating Big Data’ (2016) 23(5) George 
Mason Law Review 1129; Nils-Peter Schepp and Achim Wambach, ‘On Big Data and Its Relevance for Market Power 
Assessment’ [2015] Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 120; Daniel L Rubinfeld and Michal S Gal, ‘Access 
Barriers to Big Data’ (2017) 59 Arizona Law Review 339; Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes (n 6); Francisco Costa-Cabral 
and Orla Lynskey, ‘Family ties: The intersection between data protection and competition in EU law’ (54) 2017(1) 
Common Market Law Review 11; Konstantina Bania, ‘The role of consumer data in the enforcement of EU competition 
law’ (18) 14(1) European Competition Journal 38; Marc Bourreau, Alexandre de Streel and Inge Graef, ‘Big Data and 
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literature as to whether ‘big data’ and privacy raise specific antitrust concerns. This debate mainly 
revolves around the question whether personal data constitutes an important source of entry barriers and 
market power.  
II.1 The state of the art 
For a long time, the prevailing, orthodox view amongst antitrust scholars was that big data does not raise 
any specific competition issue. This mainstream position emphasises that, far from being a scarce 
resource or essential input, data constitutes a non-rivalrous, ubiquitous good or commodity. This means 
that the availability and informational value of data remains more or less the same, regardless of the 
number of operators that use or control it.11 The orthodox camp therefore assumes that the access to, 
and collection of personal data is relatively easy and inexpensive.12 The ability of firms to enter and 
compete on the market, therefore, does not depend on their access to a large volume or a broad scope of 
personal data.13 From this perspective, even the concentration of high volumes of personal data in the 
hands of a single firm does not necessarily create market power and entry barriers. Especially not in fast 
changing, dynamic online markets which are characterised by historic ease of entry and ephemeral 
market shares.14 
This orthodox view is, however, increasingly under assault. A growing number of antitrust scholars and 
enforcers contend that the accumulation of large amounts of personal data might give rise to important 
economies of scale15 and scope.16 They highlight that multisided online platforms also benefit from data-
driven direct and indirect network effects.17 The access to personal data might also entail important 
learning effects,18 which allow online platforms to provide better products to their users19 and offer better 
targeted advertising services to advertising customers. Personal data is, thus, capable of generating 
positive (cross-platform) feedback loops,20 for it enables online platforms to increase their attractiveness 
towards users, which in turn also allows them to attract more paying advertising customers. 
                                                   
Competition Policy: Market power, personalised pricing and advertising: Project Report - Centre on Regulation in Europe 
(CERRE)’ (2017). 
11  Sokol and Comerford (n 10), 1136; Andres V Lerner, ‘The Role of 'Big Data' in Online Platform Competition’ [2014] SSRN 
Journal, 21; Geoffrey A Manne and Ben Sperry, ‘The Problems and Perils of Bootstrapping Privacy and Data into an 
Antitrust Framework’ [2015] CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 10; Tucker and Wellford (n 10), 3–4. 
12  Sokol and Comerford (n 10), 1336–1338; Tucker and Wellford (n 10), 3,4,8; Manne and Sperry, ‘The Problems and Perils 
of Bootstrapping Privacy and Data into an Antitrust Framework’ (n 11) 10. 
13  Tucker and Wellford (n 10), 12. 
14  Sokol and Comerford (n 10), 1136–1138; Geoffrey A Manne and Ben Sperry, ‘The Law and Economics of Data and Privacy 
in Antitrust Analysis’ [2014] TPRC Conference Paper, 9; Tucker and Wellford (n 10), 7. 
15  Schepp and Wambach (n 10), 121; Bourreau, Streel and Graef (n 10) 33; Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes (n 6) 200–201. 
16  Schepp and Wambach (n 10), 121; Bourreau, Streel and Graef (n 10) 34; Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes (n 6) 21. 
17  Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility’ (1985) 75(3) The American 
Economic Review 424 424; Bundeskartellamt/Autorité de la Concurrence (n 8) 27; Schepp and Wambach (n 10), 121; 
Harbour, ‘Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour in the Matter of Google/DoubleClick F.T.C. File 
No. 071-0170’ (n 9) 5; Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes (n 6) 200–204; Bourreau, Streel and Graef (n 10) 35–36. 
18  Rubinfeld and Gal, ‘Access Barriers to Big Data’ (n 10) 355–356. Bourreau, Streel and Graef (n 10) 35. Stucke, Maurice E. 
and Grunes (n 6) 23, 45, 204. 
19  Bundeskartellamt/Autorité de la Concurrence (n 8) 29–37; Harbour and Koslove (n 10), 778; C. Argenton and J. Prüfer, 
‘Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities’ (2012) 8(1) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 73 79. 
20  David S Evans and Michael D Noel, ‘Defining Markets that Involve Multi-Sided Platform Businesses: An Empirical 
Framework with an Application to Google's Purchase of DoubleClick’ [2007] Reg-Markets Center Working Paper No. 07-
18, 5. David S Evans, ‘The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy’ [2009] Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 9. Rubinfeld and Gal, ‘Access Barriers to Big Data’ (n 10) 347, 356, 359. Bourreau, Streel and Graef (n 10) 
36. Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes (n 6) 204. 
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From this perspective, data is more than a simple commodity,21 as it constitutes an important strategic 
‘key competitive input’22 which allows firms to generate important data-driven efficiencies and gain a 
competitive edge over its competitors. To be capable of effectively competing in online markets, 
companies therefore need access to a minimum volume and variety of data which allows them to achieve 
sufficient economies of scale and scope,23 and to harness data-driven network effects. The concentration 
of large amounts of personal data might therefore entail important entry barriers24 and constitute a source 
of market power allowing the incumbent firm to tip the market in its favour.25  
While the antitrust literature still reflects a fundamental disagreement about whether the concentration 
and accumulation of personal data should be taken into account as a source of entry barriers and market 
power in competition analysis, competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have already been 
assessing the competitive role of personal data in merger analysis for quite some time. 
II.2 The state of the enforcement practice 
Three observations can be made about the role of personal data in the current state of merger 
enforcement by US and EU competition authorities. The first, most obvious, observation is that personal 
data do play an important part in the competitive analysis of data-driven mergers on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Indeed, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and 
courts, as well as the EU Commission, have so far ascertained in a number of mergers whether personal 
data give rise to or reinforce horizontal,26 vertical27 and conglomerate28 effects.29 The FTC and the EU 
Commission also assessed whether mergers are used as a tool to eliminate a potential competitor with 
                                                   
21  ibid 50. 
22  ibid 41. 
23  Rubinfeld and Gal, ‘Access Barriers to Big Data’ (n 10) 352–355. 
24  Bundeskartellamt/Autorité de la Concurrence (n 8) 27–37. Rubinfeld and Gal, ‘Access Barriers to Big Data’ (n 10) 349–
368. Harbour, ‘Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour in the Matter of Google/DoubleClick F.T.C. 
File No. 071-0170’ (n 9) 5. Inge Graef, ‘Market Definition and Market Power in Data: The Case of Online Platforms’ 
(2015) 38(4) World Competition 473 483–484. 
25  Argenton and Prüfer (n 19), 79. 
26  Federal Trade Commission, Complaint Reed Elsevier NV, et al. In the Matter of. Docket No. C-081 0133. Federal Trade 
Commission, Complaint in Dun & Bradstreet Corporation/Quality Education Data 6 May 2010. Docket No. 9342. US 
Department of Justice, Complaint in U.S. v. Bazaarvoice, Inc. Case No C. 13 0133. United States District Court of the 
Northern District of California United States v. Bazaarvoice Inc. - Memorandum Opinion (2014) Case No. 13-cv-00133-
WHO. European Commission, COMP/M.6314 Telefónica UK/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere. C(2012) 6063 final 
[529]-[557]. Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [84] - [141]. European Commission, Case COMP/M.8124 
Microsoft/LinkedIn 6 December 2016. C(2016) 8404 final [167] - [181]. 
27  European Commission, Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick 2008. O.J. C 184/10 [289] - [329]. Case COMP/M.8124 
Microsoft/LinkedIn (n 26) [246] - [277] and [370] - [381]. 
28  Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [359] - [366]. Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [180] - [189]. 
Case COMP/M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn (n 26) [278] - [352]. 
29  For a comprehensive summary of the EU Commission’s decisional practice in data-related mergers see Massimiliano Kadar 
and Bogdan Mateusz, ‘'Big Data' and EU Merger Control - A Case Review’ (2017) 8(8) Journal for European Competition 
Law & Practice 479. 
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access to an important database.30 The antitrust authorities moreover recognised that data-driven 
efficiencies may outweigh the potential anticompetitive effects of a merger.31  
The second observation is that the competition authorities and courts have only concluded in a few 
merger cases that personal data actually constitutes a source of market power. Only in three cases – 
Reed Elsevier/ChoicePoint, Dun&Bradstreet/Quality Education and Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews – have 
the US authorities and the US District Court of the Northern District of California found that personal 
data-driven entry barriers and network effects are likely to shield unilateral effects. More specifically, 
they held that the control of personal databases which are large in size, breadth and scope will give rise 
to barriers to entry and expansion in form of economies of scale and scope,32 as well as network effects33 
and reputational entry barriers.34 The role of personal data as potential source of market power emerged 
most clearly in the Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews merger where the acquiring party, Bazaarvoice, 
acknowledged in internal documents that its ‘ability to leverage the data’ of its customer base constitutes 
a ‘key entry barrier’.35 All three mergers had in common that personal data represented the actual product 
sold by the merging parties. Yet the mergers did not involve generic online user, but rather quite specific 
types of personal data; namely electronic public records,36 data for marketing to kindergarten through 
twelfth-grade teachers, administrators, schools and school districts,37 as well as online-user product 
ratings, reviews and analytics of related consumer behaviour.38 Moreover, the merging parties in all 
three cases were market leaders who closely competed with each other.39 Upon consummation of these 
acquisitions, the remaining competitors and potential entrants would therefore have had an insufficient 
access to quite specific types of personal data necessary to defeat the mergers’ anticompetitive effects. 
The third observation is that the US competition and the EU Commission were reluctant to simply 
transpose these findings to mergers involving more generic personal (online) user data or to establish a 
ready-made presumption about the competitive role of personal data. This is most prominently reflected 
in the Google/DoubleClick merger. Both the FTC and the EU Commission assessed whether the 
integration of Google’s and DoubleClick’s previously separate datasets will bestow the merged entity 
                                                   
30  Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Google/DoubleClick 2007, Statement of 
Federal Trade Commission Concerning Google/DoubleClick. FTC File No. 071-0170 8. Case COMP/M.4731 
Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [222] - [285]. Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [143] - [163]. Discussing in this 
respect the Facebook/WhatsApp, Data Systems/Conversant, Google/Nestlabs, Google/Dropcam and Google/Waze mergers 
Stucke and Grunes however critically observe that competition authorities in the US and EU underestimated the negative 
effects of mergers in data-driven markets on potential competition Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes (n 6) 74–99. 
31  European Commission, Case COMP/M.5727 MICROSOFT/ YAHOO! SEARCH BUSINESS 2010. C(2010) 1077 [223]-
[226]. Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice, Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and 
Paid Search Advertising Agreement Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc. 30 April 2017. See also Statement of 
Federal Trade Commission Concerning Google/DoubleClick (n 30) 12. 
32  Complaint Reed Elsevier NV, et al. In the Matter of (n 26) [14] - [15]. Federal Trade Commission, Analysis of Agreement 
Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment in Reed Elsevier NV, et al. In the Matter of. File No. 081-0133 1. 
Complaint in Dun & Bradstreet Corporation/Quality Education Data (n 26) [19]. 
33  Complaint in U.S. v. Bazaarvoice, Inc. (n 26) [55] - [58]. United States v. Bazaarvoice Inc. - Memorandum Opinion (n 26) 
[240] - [259]. 
34  Complaint Reed Elsevier NV, et al. In the Matter of (n 26) [14]. Complaint in Dun & Bradstreet Corporation/Quality 
Education Data (n 26) [20]. United States v. Bazaarvoice Inc. - Memorandum Opinion (n 26) [259]. 
35  Complaint in U.S. v. Bazaarvoice, Inc. (n 26) [57]. United States v. Bazaarvoice Inc. - Memorandum Opinion (n 26) [244]. 
36  Complaint Reed Elsevier NV, et al. In the Matter of (n 26). 
37  Complaint in Dun & Bradstreet Corporation/Quality Education Data (n 26). 
38  Complaint in U.S. v. Bazaarvoice, Inc. (n 26). 
39  Complaint Reed Elsevier NV, et al. In the Matter of (n 26) [12]. Complaint in Dun & Bradstreet Corporation/Quality 
Education Data (n 26) [1]. Complaint in U.S. v. Bazaarvoice, Inc. (n 26) [2]. United States v. Bazaarvoice Inc. - 
Memorandum Opinion (n 26) [3]. 
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with an overwhelming competitive advantage in the online advertising market.40 The underlying theory 
of harm assumed that the combination of Google’s ‘deep’ search data and DoubleClick’s ‘broad’ web 
surfing behaviour data might give rise to data-driven economies of scale and scope, as well as network 
and learning effects, which would allow the merged entity to better target its services and thus to attract 
more users and advertising customers.41 The US and EU competition watchdogs, however, discarded 
concerns that the combination of both parties’ datasets might eventually lead to the tipping of the market 
and marginalise competitors. A central factor in their analysis was that DoubleClick was contractually 
barred from harnessing its access to customer data in order to generate network effects, as they belonged 
to its publisher and advertising clients.42 Equally decisive for the FTC’s and Commission’s analysis was 
the finding that even if both parties were to combine their datasets, Google’s competitors in the online 
advertising market would continue to have access to a sufficient amount of equivalent – if not higher 
quality – personal data valuable for online advertising purposes.43  
Along similar lines, the EU Commission also concluded in subsequent mergers that the combination of 
previously separate personal datasets was unlikely to give rise to conglomerate,44 horizontal45 and 
vertical effects.46 This however does not mean that the EU Commission has conclusively thrown out 
theories of harm cautioning against potential anticompetitive effects arising from the combination of 
two large sets of generic user data. Rather, it found in these mergers that the theory of harm was not 
backed by the actual facts of the case. In all cases, the merging parties were constrained either by 
contract47 or by existing data protection rules in their ability to combine databases post-merger.48 Most 
importantly, in all cases the EU Commission identified a number of alternative sources of personal data 
that would allow rivals to continue to provide equivalent competing products or services post-merger.49 
The Commission’s analysis in these cases can be criticised in at least three respects. First of all, in some 
cases the Commission’s market definition focused only on the paying online advertising market, while 
ignoring the ‘free’ user side of multi-sided online platforms.50 Second, its analysis of the availability of 
                                                   
40  Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [359] - [366]. Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning 
Google/DoubleClick (n 30) 12–13. 
41  Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [359]. Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning 
Google/DoubleClick (n 30) 12. Kevin Coates, Competition law and regulation of technology markets (Oxford University 
Press 2011) 397. Peter P Swire, ‘Submitted Testimony to the Federal Trade Commission Behavioral Advertising Town 
Hall’ (2007) 
42  Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [361]-[363]. Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning 
Google/DoubleClick (n 30) 12. 
43  Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [365]. Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning 
Google/DoubleClick (n 30) 12–13. 
44  Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [180] - [189]. Case COMP/M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn (n 26) [218] - [244], 
[382] - [393]. 
45  COMP/M.6314 Telefónica UK/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere (n 26) [529] - [557]. Case COMP/M.7217 
Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [180]-[189]. Case COMP/M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn (n 26) [176] - [180]. 
46  ibid [246] - [277] and [370] - [381]. 
47  Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [179]-[189], [298], [361]-[363]. COMP/M.6314 Telefónica 
UK/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere (n 26) [552]. 
48  Case COMP/M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn (n 26) [180], [255] and [375]. 
49  Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [268]-[274], [365].Case COMP/M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn (n 26) [176] 
- [180], [259] - [262], [276], [376]. COMP/M.6314 Telefónica UK/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere (n 26) [543] - [549].  
50  This was the case in the Google/Double Click and Microsoft/Yahoo! mergers. Statement of Federal Trade Commission 
Concerning Google/DoubleClick (n 30) 1, 3. Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [44] - [81]. Case 
COMP/M.5727 MICROSOFT/ YAHOO! SEARCH BUSINESS (n 31) [60] - [87]. Harbour, ‘Dissenting Statement of 
Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour in the Matter of Google/DoubleClick F.T.C. File No. 071-0170’ (n 9) 7. Lapo 
Filistrucchi and others, ‘Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Practice’ [2013] TILEC Discussion Paper 
No. 2013-9, 16. Michal S Gal and Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust 
Enforcement’ (2016) 80(3) Antitrust Law Journal 521 551. 
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alternative sources of data for existing or potential competitors remained cursory. The Commission 
indeed broadly assumed the fungibility of various types of available user data for online advertising 
purposes without considering their specific characteristics and suitability to replicate the information 
the merging parties derived from the combination of their datasets.51 Arguably, it also underestimated 
the role of size of the combined databases. The Commission presumed that access to various, scattered 
sources of personal data would allow competitors and entrants to make up for any competitive advantage 
the merging parties obtain from the combination of two large, unfragmented datasets.52 
Despite these shortcomings, the decisional practice by the competition authorities on both sides of the 
Atlantic unequivocally shows that they take the role of personal data as potential source of market power 
seriously. Their findings that personal data might in some cases actually increase entry barriers and 
strengthen the merged entity’s market power53 contradict voices in the literature which categorically 
exclude that personal data can give rise to entry barriers, network effects and market power. The current 
state of the decisional practice of US and EU authorities appears to be rather in line with commentators 
who recommend a case-by-case analysis of the role of personal data.54 Central elements of their analysis 
are the market position of the merging parties, the conditions of entry, expansion and switching, the 
specific characteristics of the data involved. They moreover assess the availability of alternative sources 
that provide existing competitors or entrants access to personal data equivalent to that held by the 
merging parties post-merger. The current academic controversy about the relevance of personal data for 
competition analysis thus lags behind the decisional practice of EU and US competition authorities. 
While the academic community is still engaged in an acrimonious debate as to ‘whether’ personal data 
should be accounted for in competition analysis, competition authorities have already been grappling 
for a considerable time with the question of ‘how’ to assess the actual competitive impact of personal 
data. 
II.3 The Facebook/WhatsApp merger – a vanguard of competition law analysis in data-driven 
markets? 
This increasing awareness of the competitive role of personal data is most clearly reflected in the EU 
Commission’s analysis of the Facebook/WhatsApp merger. Unlike in Google/DoubleClick, in which 
the FTC’s and EU Commission’s market definition has been fiercely criticised for focusing exclusively 
on the paying advertising-side of Google’s platform,55 in Facebook/WhatsApp the Commission adopted 
a more holistic market definition. Remarkably, it assessed not only the merger’s impact on the paying 
online advertising market, but also its effects on the ‘zero priced’ markets for social networking and 
consumer communications services. Yet the Commission eventually held that merger is unlikely to 
produce unilateral effects on the social networking and consumer communications market, as Facebook 
                                                   
51  The Commission still assessed this aspect at least to some extent in Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [268] 
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52  
Case COMP/M.4731 Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [273]. 
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and WhatsApp are not close competitors.56 It also pointed out that consumers tend to multi-home and 
will remain capable of switching to competitive alternatives post-merger.57 
As in previous mergers, the Commission also considered the role of personal data as a source of market 
power, analysing economies of scale and scope, as well as network effects which might lead to barriers 
to entry and expansion, reputational entry barriers, and consumer lock-in.58 In particular, the 
Commission assessed the extent to which Facebook could strengthen its position in the online 
advertising market by obtaining access to WhatsApp’s user data so as to improve the targeting of its 
online advertising services.59 Yet, the Commission observed that the merged entity would lack the ability 
and incentive to introduce online advertising or integrate the parties’ databases. This conclusion was 
based on the observation that the matching of Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s databases would confront 
the merged entity with considerable technical hurdles60 and would require WhatsApp to change its 
privacy policy. Such a change in the privacy policy would upset consumers and prompt them to switch 
to competing apps that offer higher privacy standards.61  
The Commission’s analysis, however, did not stop here. Going one step further, it engaged in an ‘even 
if analysis’ which explored what would happen if the merged entity integrated both parties’ datasets 
despite the technological obstacles and potential losses. Even under this hypothetical scenario, the 
Commission concluded that the merger would not bring about any anticompetitive harm on the online 
advertising market. Rather, potential anticompetitive effects would be offset by a sufficient number of 
alternative platforms providing online advertising space and collecting user data that is not within the 
merged entity’s exclusive control. 62 
In light of the prominent role played by personal data in the Commission’s assessment, the 
Facebook/WhatsApp merger has been referred to in the literature as ‘the vanguard of the current analysis 
of data-driven mergers in multisided markets, where the product or service is free’.63 Yet this view has 
been at least partially called into question by the subsequent change in WhatsApp’s privacy-policy, less 
than two years after the merger. The merged entity’s actual conduct thus blatantly belied the 
Commission’s predictions which had played an important role in its unconditional clearance of the 
merger. As a natural experiment, the merger provides the unequivocal empirical evidence that the 
Commission’s merger analysis committed an assessment error with respect to the merging parties’ 
incentives to combine their previously separate sets of personal data. This brings us back to our initial 
question: Did the Commission get its analysis in the Facebook/WhatsApp decision wrong? Could it 
have been aware of merged entity’s incentives to integrate Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s databases post-
merger? How can the Commission’s error be explained?  
The most straightforward explanation for the Commission’s erroneous assessment is that it blindly relied 
on the merging parties’ misleading information when they claimed that they would be technologically 
unable to match their databases.64 This interpretation is, however, not very plausible, in so far as the 
Commission itself has pointed out that this contention was not decisive for its decision to clear the 
                                                   
56  Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [101], [106] - [107]. 
57  With regard to consumer communications market see ibid [105] - [114]. With regard to the social networking market see 
ibid [144] - [146]. 
58  ibid [113], [127] - [136]. Eleonora Ocello and others, ‘What's Up with Merger Control in the Digital Sector? Lessons from 
the Facebook/WhatsApp EU merger case’ (2015/1) 4 accessed 28 April 2017. 
59  Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [180] - [190]. Ocello and others (n 58) 6. 
60  Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [185]. 
61  ibid [186], see also [173] - [174]. 
62  ibid [188]- [189], see also [176]-[179]. 
63  Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes (n 6) 79. 
64  European Commission, ‘Press Release - Commission alleges Facebook provided misleading information about WhatsApp 
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merger. Indeed, under the ‘even if’ analysis, the Commission had ruled out any anticompetitive effects 
on the online-advertising market, even in the unlikely event that the merged entity was to start collecting 
and using data from WhatsApp users.65 It is, therefore, safe to assume that Facebook’s submission of 
misleading information is not the reason for the Commission’s assessment error. 
On the contrary, I contend that the errors in the Commission’s assessment can be explained by its failure 
to account for the economic role of privacy and the disclosure of personal data in its analysis of 
anticompetitive harm. Indeed, even if the Commission recognized the role of privacy policies as an 
increasingly important competitive parameter in the consumer communications services market,66 the 
Commission at no time considered whether the matching of Facebook and WhatsApp’s databases and 
the ensuing change in WhatsApp’s privacy policy would cause consumer harm in the form of lower 
privacy protection on the consumer communications market. Such an analysis, however, would have 
shifted the Commission’s analytical focus on the economic role and strategic value of personal data in 
the online eco-system.67 Most importantly, it would have prevented the Commission from hastily 
concluding that Facebook and WhatsApp lack the incentives to combine their databases and that the 
merger would not cause any antitrust harm, even under the assumption that the parties might adopt such 
a strategy. 
Taking into consideration the economic role of privacy would have enabled the Commission to 
accurately assess the merging parties’ incentive to integrate their datasets post-merger. It would have 
revealed that the potential benefits arising from the matching of Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s databases 
would have exceeded potential losses as a consequence of consumer switching in response to a 
deterioration of WhatsApp’s privacy protection. A privacy-related theory of harm would also have 
directed the focus of the Commission’s analysis of potential anticompetitive effects from the online 
advertising to direct consumer harm in the form of lower privacy protection on the consumer 
communications apps market. While the Commission had concluded that the combination of databases 
would not cause any competitive harm on the online advertising market, the Commission simply omitted 
to assess whether this would entail any consumer harm on the consumer communications markets. 
Far from looking at potential privacy-related consumer harm in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, the 
EU Commission instead reiterated the same old mantra that privacy concerns as such do not fall within 
the scope of EU competition law, but are to be dealt with under the EU data protection rules.68 The 
Facebook/WhatsApp merger thus shows that even though competition authorities already account for 
the competitive relevance of personal data, the role of privacy or data protection remains an important 
blind spot in their antitrust and merger analysis. In other words, while the ‘whether’ seems to be settled, 
the ‘how’ definitely needs improvement: although regularly assessing the role of personal data as 
potential source of market power, competition authorities so far turn a blind eye to privacy-related 
consumer harm. 
III. Privacy as antitrust concern 
The EU Commission‘s failure to assess and identify the potential consumer harm arising from the 
matching of Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s databases can be explained by the fact that antitrust 
scholarship and enforcers have so far fallen short of putting forward a coherent theory of privacy-related 
consumer harm. While antitrust commentators and authorities have identified several data-related 
theories of harm, they exclusively focus on the role of personal data as a source of market power and 
                                                   
65  European Commission (n 5). 
66  Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [87]. 
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anti-competitive foreclosure. This is not only the case in the realm of merger control, 69 but also for 
theories of harm which examine vertical restraints on data-portability70 and data as essential facility.71 
Likewise, other less conventional theories assessing whether the cross-usage of data72 by a dominant 
market player may marginalize rivals exclusively focus on data as a source of anticompetitive 
foreclosure.  
If applied to the online environment all these foreclosure theories locate the anticompetitive harm on the 
paying customer side of multisided platforms. These foreclosure effects only cause indirect (end-) 
consumer harm if they enable multisided platforms to charge non-competitive mark-ups on their online 
advertising services, which are then passed on to consumer prices for advertised goods or services.73 By 
contrast, thus far, commentators and antitrust authorities have not assessed to what extent the 
accumulation of personal data not only harms competitors and advertising customers, but might actually 
also have immediate negative effects on consumers on the ‘free’ user side of online platforms.  
III.1 Privacy-related theories of consumer harm 
The blame for this absence of a clear privacy-related theory of antitrust harm lies, in my view, with the 
orthodox assumption that privacy does not constitute an antitrust concern, but should be properly 
addressed by consumer protection or privacy legislation.74 This institutional argument hinges upon the 
assumption that data protection and efficiency or consumer welfare, as predominant goals of antitrust,75 
constitute incommensurable values which cannot be adequately balanced within the framework of 
antitrust analysis. This assumption has been expressly endorsed by the FTC, the EU Commission and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, all of whom have repeatedly held that informational privacy 
and data protection concerns are irrelevant for competition assessment and are adequately protected 
under specific privacy and data-protection regulation.76 The orthodox view thus equates privacy or data 
protection with other non-economic public policy objectives, such as environmental protection or 
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employment, which traditionally fall outside the scope of competition law analysis.77 This view, which 
also guided the Commission’s analysis in Facebook/WhatsApp,78 is, however, increasingly being 
challenged by commentators and – paradoxically – by the Commission’s subsequent enforcement 
practice itself. The academic literature and, to a certain extent also the Commission's decisional practice, 
now point towards three routes that may enable the integration of privacy concerns into competition 
analysis. 
III.1.1 Privacy as an element of product quality 
The first route consists of considering the importance of privacy as one factor of product quality, which 
constitutes an important non-price parameter of competition in online markets. 79 Interestingly, EU and 
US antitrust authorities alike underline the importance of non-price parameters of competition, such as 
product quality, for their merger analysis. 80 The EU General Court also confirmed the Commission’s 
approach in Microsoft/Skype where it assessed the merger’s potentially detrimental impact on non-price 
competition in the form of degradation of innovation and service quality.81 The increasing importance 
of non-price competition perhaps surfaces most clearly in the EU Commission’s recent analysis of the 
Dow Chemical/DuPont merger. In this case, the EU Commission not only extensively ascertained the 
concentration’s effect on the non-price parameter of innovation in the crop production industry,82 but 
also pointed to the merger’s effect on public policy concerns, such as food safety and food security.83 
Along similar lines, competition authorities could assess how a merger affects data protection as an 
important facet of product quality or innovation and even account for the broader societal consequences 
of a reduction in privacy protection. 
Antitrust authorities have, however, been largely reluctant to block a merger on the sole ground of its 
negative effect on product quality or other parameters of non-price competition.84 This is clearly 
reflected in the Commission’s analysis in Facebook/WhatsApp, where it observed that privacy is 
increasingly valued by consumers.85 Yet it shied away from actually assessing whether the merger would 
lead to a decrease in privacy being an important element of product quality. This reluctance might be 
explained by the fact that, unlike price, product quality is a multi-dimensional concept, which is difficult 
to measure and might give rise to imprecise and complex comparisons.86 Moreover, the relationship 
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between privacy and other features of product quality is ambiguous, because the access to more user 
data may also enable an online platform to improve the overall product quality.87 
Again unlike price, product quality is also a highly subjective concept. Consequently, competition 
authorities might be confronted with difficult interpersonal comparisons, when they have to compare 
the harm to a small consumer group which values privacy as product quality, with the potential benefits 
that a majority of consumers derives from a merger.88 In order to avoid the difficulties of assessing a 
merger’s effect on product quality, the orthodox view simply assumes that product quality is actually 
reflected in quality-adjusted prices. It therefore concludes that it is sufficient to focus on the merger’s 
effects on prices.89 This view not only reflects the predominant influence of neoclassical price theory on 
competition analysis, but also illustrates that antitrust authorities lack adequate tools and methodologies 
to account for privacy as a non-price dimension of product quality.90  
III.1.2 Privacy as an element of consumer choice 
A second route to incorporate privacy in competition law analysis consists in framing privacy as an 
important element of consumer choice. This consumer choice approach has been most recently endorsed 
by the EU Commission in the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger. This decision, handed down two years after 
the clearance of the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, constitutes the first – and so far only – occasion where 
the Commission recognised that the matching of generic personal user data might foster conglomerate 
effects capable of foreclosing competitors or potential entrants.91 The Microsoft/LinkedIn merger 
constitutes all the more a turning point in the Commission’s assessment of data-driven mergers in so far 
as it held that these foreclosure effects would give rise to privacy-related consumer harm, because they 
are likely to eliminate existing competitors which offer their users a higher degree of privacy protection 
than LinkedIn does. The merger would thus have restricted consumer choice in relation to privacy, 
which, in the Commission’s view, constitutes an important parameter of competition.92  
At first glance, the Commission’s approach of framing privacy-related consumer harm as a reduction in 
consumer choice seems to be an appealing solution. This approach is in line with the merger policy 
guidelines on both sides of the Atlantic, which acknowledge that the reduction of product variety 
produces consumer harm.93 It also reflects the importance EU competition law traditionally attributes to 
consumer choice94 and stands for a more holistic understanding of consumer welfare.95 
The consumer choice approach, however, also bears a number of shortcomings. While being a useful 
tool to identify privacy-related consumer harm resulting from vertical or conglomerate foreclosure 
effects, it is only of limited analytical added value for the assessment of privacy harm as a consequence 
of a horizontal merger, which by definition reduces consumer choice by eliminating one independent 
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player from the market. In the context of horizontal unilateral effects analysis, consumer choice is 
actually already accounted for by the assessment of the closeness of competition between the merging 
parties. Indeed, a horizontal merger would only lead to the elimination of consumer choice if the 
acquired merging party is a close competitor of, and, consequently, provides an important competitive 
alternative with respect to the products of the acquiring party. This is also reflected in 
Facebook/WhatsApp where the Commission held that the merger is unlikely to harm competition on the 
consumer communications services market, because the merging parties are not close competitors. Even 
if the Commission had held that both parties were close competitors, or that WhatsApp could be 
considered as a maverick firm with regard to privacy, 96 it would still have faced similar challenges as 
those under the ‘product quality’ route. The Commission, in fact, would have been required to carry out 
a tricky balancing exercise weighing the restrictions of consumer choice with pro-competitive 
efficiencies. 
III.1.3 Privacy as a non-monetary price 
The shortcomings of the product quality and consumer choice approaches could be at least partially 
addressed by a third way of incorporating privacy into competition analysis, which conceptualizes the 
disclosure of personal data as a non-monetary price users pay in order to use free goods and services. In 
fact, a growing strand in the literature stresses that personal data is more than a mere element of product 
quality or consumer choice. Rather, personal data or privacy increasingly constitute the actual non-
monetary counterpart that consumers pay for using free goods or services on the user side of zero-priced 
online platforms.97  
The intuition that privacy constitutes the actual price consumers pay in online markets is informed by 
the economic concept of ‘privacy calculus’.98 This model assumes that consumers assess and trade-off 
the costs and benefits of disclosing personal information when engaging in online transactions or 
choosing free online services,99 with the aim of maximising their gains, i.e. the difference between costs 
and benefits of the information disclosure.100 It therefore also makes economic sense to refer to the 
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Information Systems Proceedings 2–3 <http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2002/> accessed 22 November 2017; Joseph E Phelps, 
Giles D'Souza and Glen J Nowak, ‘Antecedents and Consequences of Consumer Privacy Concerns: An Empirical 
Investigation’ (2001) 15(4) Journal of Interactive Marketing 2 4; Dinev and Hart Paul (n 98), 62. 
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amount of personal data to be transferred in exchange for the free service provided as the non-monetary 
price consumers pay when they use a zero-priced good or service.101 If one accepts the economic premise 
that personal data or privacy constitute the price consumers pay for free online services, a decrease in 
privacy is to be considered as tantamount to an increase in price.102 
III.2 Practical implications of the concept of privacy-price 
What would be the added value of framing privacy as price in merger analysis? In my view, such an 
approach would expand the toolbox of merger control in data-driven markets in two respects.  
III.2.1 Privacy-price as methodological tool for market definition 
In the first place, the insight that privacy constitutes a non-monetary price in data-driven markets might 
enable competition authorities to stay abreast of major challenges posed by market definition in online 
markets characterised by the presence of multisided platforms and the provision of zero-priced online 
services. These challenges are twofold.  
On the one hand, in a number of cases competition authorities and courts failed to account for the 
interdependencies between the different market-sides of multisided platforms. They focused exclusively 
on their paying, advertising side, while ignoring the free, user side.103 Economic literature, however, 
emphasizes that a market definition focusing only on the paying side of a multisided platform does not 
adequately identify the potential consumer harm, and also ignores the competitive constraints exercised 
by customers or competitors on its free user side. Competition authorities should, therefore, holistically 
include all relevant sides of the platform in their market definition, in order to account for the 
competitive interdependencies and dynamics between the different platform sides.104 
On the other hand, zero-pricing adds another layer of methodological complexity to market definition 
in the online eco-system. Indeed, the conventional method of defining markets, the hypothetical 
monopolist, or Small, but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test, relies on prices 
to identify the competitive constraints in a given market. Yet prices are not the most appropriate 
analytical tool to analyse competition in markets where goods or services are provided for free, and 
price, consequently, does not constitute a parameter of competition.105  
To address these challenges, a number of antitrust commentators have therefore suggested that 
competition authorities should define a market which accounts for the role of personal data on both the 
                                                   
101  Pamela J Harbour, ‘Concurring Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, FTC Staff Report: Self-Regulatory 
Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising’ (2009); European Data Protection Supervisor (n 7) 19; Swire (n 41); Robert 
H Lande, ‘The Microsoft-Yahoo Merger: Yes, Privacy Is an Antitrust Concern’ [2008] University of Baltimore School of 
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Privacy's Price’ (2012) 90(5) North Carolina Law Review 1327 1346, 1357-1362. 
102  Stucke, Maurice E. and Ezrachi (n 97), 36; Newman (n 10), 442–443; Bundeskartellamt/Autorité de la Concurrence (n 8) 
24–25.  
103  Harbour, ‘Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour in the Matter of Google/DoubleClick F.T.C. File 
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Google/DoubleClick (n 27) [44] - [81]. United States District Court of the Northern District of California Kinderstart.com 
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Competition Policy International 151 159–161. David S Evans and Michael Noel, ‘Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms 
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paying and free market-sides of a multisided platform when assessing data-driven mergers. 106 To this 
end, they could use privacy as a proxy to substitute monetary prices as a methodological tool for market 
definition. Instead of assessing consumers’ reaction in response to a Small, but Significant and Non-
transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) by a hypothetical monopolist, competition authorities could define 
a data market by testing users’ response to a Small, but Significant and Non-transitory Decrease in 
Privacy (SSNDP test).107 The SSNDP test, thus, incorporates the insight that consumers barter on the 
user side of multisided online platforms the disclosure of personal data in exchange for free services.108 
The analytical added-value of accounting for personal data as an essential element of market definition 
has, however, been repeatedly challenged. Antitrust commentators stress that in most cases personal 
data only constitutes an input for other products and services, such as online advertising services. From 
this vantage point, the definition of a data market only makes sense if data constitutes the actual product 
to be sold on a market.109 This argument, however, obfuscates the underlying economic value of personal 
data in the online platform eco-system and turns a blind eye to the fact that privacy constitutes the 
economic counterpart users barter in exchange of services on the free user side of online platforms.  
The limitations of this argument become evident in the Commission’s market definition in 
Facebook/WhatsApp. The Commission indeed echoed this view when it refrained from defining any 
separate product market for personal data. It held that there is no separate market for user data, as 
Facebook did not sell any data or data-analysing services and that WhatsApp did not collect any data 
valuable for advertising purposes.110 By exclusively focusing on whether personal data is actually sold, 
or used as an input on the advertising side of the merging multisided platforms, the Commission ignored, 
however, the role of privacy as non-monetary price on the free consumer communications market. The 
Commission’s approach thus replicated a similar error to that which arises if a market definition 
exclusively focuses on the paying side of a multisided platform. 
The Commission’s reluctance to account for privacy or data in its market definition of the consumer 
communications services market indeed constitutes one explanatory factor for its failure to predict 
consumer harm as a consequence of the matching of Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s databases and the 
ensuing change in WhatsApp privacy policy. Although accounting for both the paying (online 
advertising services) and free (social networking, consumer communications services) market sides of 
the merging multisided platforms, it assessed each market in isolation and under the prism of price 
increases. This static market definition, however, completely overlooked the existing spillover effects 
between the advertising and the consumer communications services market. Yet, in hindsight, it is 
exactly these cross-platform effects which explain why the merging party eventually integrated 
Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s databases. 
By looking at the consumer communications services and online advertising markets in isolation, the 
Commission characterized the matching of the parties’ datasets and the ensuing change in WhatsApp’s 
privacy policy as a self-defeating strategy. This conclusion, however, rests on the erroneous assumption 
that a change in WhatsApp’s privacy policy would induce consumers to switch to competing apps on 
the consumer communications services market. This, in turn, would also entail negative spillovers on 
the online advertising side, which would inflict even more losses on the merged entity. The problem of 
this assumption is, however, that it implicitly relies on a market definition which applies the analytical 
prism of the SSNIP test to a zero-priced market. In a multisided platform environment, a price increase 
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indeed not only triggers consumer switching on the user side, but is also likely to decrease the 
attractiveness of the platform and consequently entail demand-side substitution on its advertising side. 
Yet this negative feedback effect between the free and paying side of the multisided platform does not 
necessarily materialise in the case of privacy-price increases. Owing to information asymmetries, it is 
more difficult for consumers to detect changes in privacy policy than monetary price increases. Hence, 
consumers will not necessarily switch in response to a change in the level of privacy protection, even if 
switching costs are low. Unlike a price increase, a decrease in the protection of privacy will also not 
necessarily lead to a spillover effect that decreases the platform’s attractiveness for advertisers. As a 
result, it might even boost the attractiveness of the platform’s advertising side, as the access to a larger 
amount of user data enables the platform to provide better targeted advertising services. 
The definition of a hypothetical data market by means of an SSNDP test would have allowed the 
Commission to apprehend the competitive relationship between Facebook and WhatsApp with respect 
to privacy and to identify the positive feedback effect that a change in the privacy level in the consumer 
communications services market might have on the online advertising market. Such a dynamic market 
definition, informed by the concept of privacy-price, would have indicated that, far from being a self-
defeating strategy, a lowering of privacy protection and an increase of the privacy-price on the free user 
side may constitute rather a strategic complement to a profit-maximizing strategy on the online 
advertising market. 
III.2.2 Privacy-price as an analytical basis for a theory of privacy-related consumer harm 
The theory of harm is the second domain in which the conceptualization of personal data as a price 
would enhance competition authorities’ merger analysis. Focusing on privacy as a non-monetary price 
for free online services, in fact, points to a more immediate form of consumer harm on the free user side 
of online platforms than does competition authorities’ current focus on indirect consumer harm as a 
consequence of data-driven foreclosure. The concept of a privacy-price, indeed, suggests that a decrease 
in privacy protection resulting from a merger may lead to a reduction in consumer welfare akin to that 
resulting from price increases.111  
This proposition is actually less esoteric than it might actually appear in the first place. The German 
Competition Authority, for instance, has recently articulated such a theory of direct privacy-related 
consumer harm in its current investigation against Facebook.112 The Bundeskartellamt has come to the 
preliminary conclusion that Facebook has abused its dominant position and exploited users by imposing 
unfair terms and conditions on consumers which constituted a systematic violation of data protection 
rules.113  
A similar theory of harm has the potential to also inform and complement the unilateral effects analysis 
in horizontal mergers that assesses whether the proposed transaction bestows the merged entity with the 
ability and incentives to raise prices or decrease output or quality to the detriment of consumers. Instead 
of focusing exclusively on the merger’s unilateral effects on price or quality, the competition authority 
could also determine to what extent the elimination of competitive constraints as a result of the removal 
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of a close competitor increases the merged entity’s ability and incentive to deteriorate the level of 
privacy.114 Such would be the case if the merged entity could internalize part of the losses arising from 
users’ demand substitution in response to the decrease in the level of privacy, by diverting part of these 
users to the previously independent close competitor.115 The privacy-price concept thus would allow 
competition authorities to integrate privacy in their upward pricing pressure test in horizontal merger 
cases. Moreover, a unilateral effects analysis focusing on privacy harm could also account for the overall 
effect of the merger on privacy within a given market, by assessing to what extent the ‘strategic 
complementarity’ between the merged entity and its competitors entices other providers to lower their 
privacy standards.116  
Such a privacy-related theory of consumer harm would have enriched the Commission’s analysis in the 
Facebook/WhatsApp merger in several respects. First, it would have provided the Commission with a 
clear theory of harm as to how the merger between Facebook/WhatsApp negatively affected users in the 
consumer communications market. In its assessment, the Commission engaged in the first step of a 
unilateral effects analysis on the consumer communications market without articulating a specific theory 
of harm. The Commission simply omitted to explain whether it was looking for an increase in price, or 
decrease in quality or innovation as a potential outcome of the merger. Instead, the Commission found 
that merger did not raise any competition concerns in this market, because the merging parties were not 
close competitors. Based on the concept of privacy-price, the Commission could have realised that the 
concentration of the two parties’ datasets would not only give rise to potential antitrust concerns on the 
online advertising market, but was likely to increase privacy-prices on the consumer communications 
market. In fact, the potential combination of both parties’ datasets and the ensuing decrease in 
WhatsApp’s privacy protection should have been the main object of the Commission’s unduly truncated 
unilateral effects analysis on the consumer communications market.  
Second, a theory of harm based on the concept of a privacy-price would have provided the Commission 
with a more comprehensive understanding of the closeness of competition between Facebook and 
WhatsApp. The Commission’s finding that the parties are not close competitors hinged upon the 
observation that Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s messenger apps are complementary products rather than 
being in direct competition to each other,117 since consumers are multi-homing118 and the two apps differ 
in their functionalities and privacy policy.119 Instead of apprehending privacy as the actual price 
consumers pay in exchange for the free use of consumer communications apps, the Commission 
perceived privacy merely as one quality dimension of a consumer communications app.120 At no time, 
however, did the Commission assess the extent to which WhatsApp exercised through the higher level 
of privacy protection of its app a competitive constraint on Facebook messenger. A privacy-based theory 
of harm assessing consumers’ reactions to changes in the level of privacy would have yielded a more 
accurate picture of the closeness of the competitive relationship between the merging parties and their 
rivals on the consumer communications market. 
Third, a theory of harm which conceptualizes privacy as a price would have complemented the 
Commission’s analysis of the merged entity’s ability and incentive to match the parties’ datasets and 
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lower WhatsApp’s privacy protection post-merger. The Commission could have actually assessed under 
the unilateral effects analysis to what extent the merger, by removing WhatsApp or Facebook as an 
important competitive constraint, would have enabled the parties to partially internalize potential losses 
ensuing from consumer demand otherwise diverted to the merging partner in response to the lowering 
of privacy protection. Absent the merger, both parties might have faced potential losses as a consequence 
of consumers switching in response to the lowering of their privacy standards. The merger thus might 
have allowed Facebook and WhatsApp to profitably lower their privacy protection, by enabling them to 
capture part of the losses which would have made such a strategy unprofitable prior to the merger. As a 
consequence, a unilateral effects analysis focusing on the merger’s effect on privacy-price on the 
consumer communications market would have prevented the Commission from erroneously concluding 
that the merged entity would lack the incentives to engage in such a strategy.  
The Commission’s erroneous assessment of Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s incentives, indeed, relied 
heavily on the assumption that they would refrain from such a strategy since consumers were multi-
homing and faced low switching costs in the consumer communications market. This assumption, 
however, presupposes that consumers are able to detect changes in privacy-prices with the same ease as 
monetary price increases. Such an assumption, however, ignores the role of information asymmetries 
on users’ switching behaviour in response to changes in privacy. Moreover, the Commission did not 
attribute sufficient weight to the importance of direct network effects being the source of consumer lock-
in and status quo bias. Arguably, these network effects clearly advantaged WhatsApp and Facebook as 
market leaders in all EU Member States.121 In hindsight, Facebook’s decision to integrate the merging 
parties’ databases post-merger suggests that potential countervailing effects of multi-homing and low 
switching costs were arguably defeated by the important network effects which locked-in consumers 
and prevented them from churning to competing apps in response to an increase of privacy-prices post-
merger. Unlike a theory of harm relying on price as a competitive parameter, a privacy-related theory 
of harm would thus also fare better in accounting for insights of behavioural economics regarding the 
effect of information asymmetries and cognitive biases on consumers’ privacy choices and switching 
behaviour. 
Fourth, a unilateral effects analysis and market definition focusing on privacy as a price would have 
enabled the Commission to internalize cross-platform effects in its unilateral effects analysis on the 
consumer communications market. On this basis, the Commission would have grasped that the merged 
entity’s incentives to integrate both parties’ databases had been reinforced by the potential gains in 
advertising revenues as a consequence of a combination of WhatsApp’s with Facebook’s user data. In 
retrospect, one can assume that the merged entity’s expected increased revenues in the online advertising 
market have outweighed any potential losses due to consumer switching in the consumer 
communications services market in response to a deterioration of WhatsApp’s privacy policy. 
Therefore, a holistic assessment of the merging parties’ incentives, internalizing spillover effects 
between different sides of a platform, would have allowed the Commission to predict the incentives of 
the merged entity and to foresee its negative impact on privacy standards on the consumer 
communications services market.  
Finally, a privacy-related theory of harm might also have enabled the Commission to assess the extent 
to which Facebook perceived WhatsApp as a maverick in the consumer communications services market 
and as a potential competitive threat to its core business in the social networking market. Before the 
merger, in most EU countries,122 WhatsApp had changed its business model from a subscription-based 
to a free-of-charge provision of its app. Unlike Facebook, WhatsApp, however, continued to rely on a 
‘no ads’ and privacy-based business model before the merger. In the long term, this could have 
undermined Facebook’s user-data- and advertising-driven business model as allegedly the only 
economically feasible way of providing free of charge social networking and communication services.  
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IV. How can competition authorities measure privacy-price increases?  
The argument that the Commission’s assessment of the Facebook/WhatsApp merger should have taken 
into account privacy as the price in the context of market definition and the analysis of privacy-related 
competition harm begs, however, the question as to how price increases in form of deterioration of 
privacy protection can be measured. Arguably, the Commission could have relied on two different 
methodologies to identify price increases or consumer harm in the form of changes in the level of 
privacy. 
IV.1 Qualitative methods 
For the time being, commentators and competition authorities have put the emphasis almost exclusively 
on qualitative ways to measure privacy-related consumer harm. In a recent report, the French and 
German competition authorities, for instance, suggested that data protection regulation might constitute 
an adequate qualitative benchmark for determining exploitative abuses. Accordingly, non-compliance 
with privacy regulations would clearly indicate exploitative conduct.123 While this approach may 
constitute a useful tool for the backward-looking competition assessment in unilateral and coordinated 
practices, it is of limited added value for the forward-looking assessment of a merger’s impact on 
privacy. In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission therefore explicitly discarded such an approach, 
pointing out that merged entity would continue to be bound by EU data protection regulation post-
merger.124 On this basis, it concluded that competition law intervention is not warranted, as it would 
duplicate the role of data protection rules which would sanction the merged entity’s future infringement 
of privacy rules.  
This, however, does not mean that privacy-related consumer harm is irrelevant for merger analysis. On 
the contrary, it is conceivable that a merger entails a decrease in privacy protection, without necessarily 
violating EU data protection or US privacy rules. To capture such an increase in the privacy-price, the 
Commission could have ‘measured’ the deterioration of the level of privacy as a consequence of the 
matching of Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s user databases in qualitative terms by comparing the merging 
parties’ potential privacy policies pre- and post-merger. A change in WhatsApp’s or Facebook’s privacy 
policies which requires consumers to disclose a higher amount of personal information for their 
messenger post-merger than required for the use of the identical service pre-merger, could have been 
interpreted as a price increase.125 While the exact amount of the price increase would be difficult to 
quantify, the Commission could have differentiated between different degrees or magnitudes of price 
increases depending on the importance of the change in the privacy policy. To grasp the magnitude of 
potential consumer harm, the Commission could have run through different scenarios with regard to 
both the volume and the sensitivity of the additional personal data required as a consequence of the 
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merger. A qualitative benchmarking of privacy-price increase, however, basically boils down to a 
sophisticated version of the product quality approach. As a result, even if an increase in the privacy-
price was identified in qualitative terms, it would remain unclear how it should be balanced with the 
potential pro-competitive effects of the merger under scrutiny. 
IV.2 Conjoint analysis as quantitative method 
This shortcoming of qualitative approaches could be addressed by quantifying the consumer harm 
arising from a decrease in the merged entity’s level of privacy protection in monetary terms. The 
‘privacy calculus’ model not only provides for an economically-informed underpinning of the 
proposition that privacy constitutes the actual price paid by consumers for the provision of free online 
services. It might also serve as the appropriate analytical framework for competition authorities to 
quantify a potential non-monetary privacy-price increase as the consequence of a merger. Indeed, 
several empirical economic studies used the concept of the privacy calculus as a starting point to 
determine users’ willingness to pay for privacy in monetary terms by means of a conjoint analysis.126 
Initially developed by the marketing literature, conjoint analyses are widely used as a methodological 
tool to identify how certain features of a differentiated product are valued by consumers and, thus, 
influence consumers’ choices and willingness to pay.127 To this end, conjoint analysis models identify 
and gauge the respective value of specific product attributes (the so called ‘part-worths’) for consumers’ 
overall utility,128 by measuring how changes in product attributes influence consumers’ preferences and 
evaluative judgments.129 Unlike other stated preference surveys, conjoint analysis relies on economic 
experiments in the form of choice-tasks, which confront them with ‘hypothetical, but realistic choice 
problems’ in the form of different variations or profiles of a given product (so-called ‘stimuli’).130 
Engaging in a reverse engineering of consumer’s purchase decisions,131 conjoint analysis thus tries to 
mimic situations that consumers face in the market place, rather than relying on consumers’ stated 
preferences. 
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Being increasingly used in competition cases to measure consumers’ willingness to pay for non-price 
features of a specific product,132 I suggest here133 that the conjoint analysis would provide competition 
authorities with an administrable methodological tool to measure and quantify the consumer harm likely 
to arise from the potential change in the merging parties’ privacy policy.134 To carry out such an analysis, 
the competition authority could organise, in a first step, as part of its market analysis a consumer survey. 
In so doing, it could identify the relevant price and non-price attributes and determine the different 
attributive levels for a given product.135 In the Facebook/WhatsApp case, the Commission could have 
identified the product attributes and attributive levels for the consumer communications apps set out in 
Table 1. 
 
 
  
                                                   
132  For the relevance of the conjoint analysis in US competition law  Jonathan B Baker and Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘Empirical 
Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique’ (1999) 1(1/2) American Law and Economics Review 386 386; 
Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘Quantitative Methods in Antitrust’ [2008] Issues in Competition Law and Policy - ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law 723, 736. US Copyright Royalty Board, Determination of Rates and Terms for Digital Performance in Sound 
Recording and Ephemeral Recording (WEB IV) - Testimony of Daniel McFadden. Docket No. 14-CRB-0001-WR. For the 
role of conjoint analyis for EU competition law OECD, ‘Economic Evidence in Merger Analysis’ (2011) 183; Doris 
Hildebrand, ‘Using Conjoint Analysis for Market Definition: Application of Modern Market Research Tools to Implement 
the Hypothetical Monopolist Test’ (2006) 29(2) World Competition 315; Hurley (n 130), 62–64. Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien 
Geradin and Eric van Damme, ‘Identifying Two-Sided Markets’ (36) 2013(1) World Competition 33 53–54. Simon Bishop 
and Markus Baldauf, ‘Theoretische Grundlagen und praktische Anwendung wettbewerbsökonomischer Methoden in Bezug 
auf die Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes und Fragen zur praktischen Anwendbarkeit des Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes 
zur Ermittlung des Konzentrationsgrades: RBB Studie’ (2016) 57–65.In particular, the Dutch National Competition 
Authority has played a pioneering role in using conjoint analysis in merger analysis Imthorn, Kemp and Nobel (n 130). 
Marco Varkevisser and Frederik T Schut, ‘The impact of geographicmarket definition on the stringency of hospital merger 
control in Germany and the Netherlands’ (2017) 7 Heatlh Economics, Policy and Law 363 375.In the context of Art. 101 
(3) TFEU , the Dutch Competition authority for instance relied on conjoint analysis in order to quantify consumers’ 
willingness to pay for production methods that enhance the animal welfare of chicken. Dutch Competition Authority 
(ACM), ‘ACM’s analysis of the sustainability arrangements concerning the ‘Chicken of Tomorrow’’ (2015) 
<https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/13789/ACMs-analysis-of-the-sustainability-arrangements-concerning-
the-Chicken-of-Tomorrow/>; Chris Fonteijn and Jarig van Sinderen, ‘Economic Analysis as a Tool to Improve Decision-
Making’ (2015) 11(1) Competition Law International 61 66–67; Machiel Mulder and Sigourney Zomer, ‘Dutch 
Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for Broiler Welfare’ (2017) 20(2) Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science 137. 
133  In her recent article, Konstantina Bania interestingly suggests that ‚stated preferences‘ studies and conjoint analysis could 
inform competition authorities about how consumers value privacy in the context of market definition Bania (n 10), 51–
55. Focusing exclusively on the role of conjoint analysis for market definition, her proposition, however, does not set out 
the full potential of this methodology for the assessment of consumer harm and its advantages compared to other stated 
preferences methodologies, such as traditional consumer surveys. ibid 51–52. 
134  The literature distinguishes between five different methods of conjoint analysis, namely (i) conjoint value analysis (CVA), 
(ii) adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA), (iii) choice-based conjoint analysis (CBC), (iv) adaptive choice-based conjoint 
analysis (ACBC) and (v) menu-based conjoint analysis (MBC). Imthorn, Kemp and Nobel (n 130) 11. For illustrative 
purposes, the following example relies on the traditional CVA. Consumers‘ willingness to pay for privacy could also be 
assessed by means of a CBC experiment. 
135  Arguably, this exercise is already part of the competition analysis in mergers, as the competition authorities have to 
determine the product features and specificities for the product market definition. Case COMP/M.7217 
Facebook/Whatsapp (n 2) [13] - [33]. 
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Table 1 - Product attributes and attributive levels of consumer communications services136 
Attribute Attributive Level 
Price 
• free (0 €) ;or  
• paying (1,99 €) 
Network popularity 
• 5%  of friends/contacts using the same app 
• 25 %  
• 50%  
• more than 50%  
Number of communication parties 
• one-to-one and/or  
• group chats 
Functionalities 
• text 
• photo 
• voice messaging 
• video messaging  
• video chat  
• group chat  
• voice call  
• sharing of location and other information 
Availability 
• only on one operating system (proprietary app)  
• or multiple operating systems (cross-platform apps) 
Platform compatibility 
• only smartphone  
• all mobile devices  
• all electronic communication devices 
Privacy 
• no disclosure of personal information, 
• disclosure of a basic profile (name plus additional 
identifier (i.e. email address or phone number)  
• full profile 
• profile of contacts and friends (interdependent 
privacy)
137
 
In a second step, the competition authority could design different profiles (stimuli) of consumer 
communications apps, by bundling varying attributes138 and attributive levels. In a third step, a 
                                                   
136  Gergely Biczók and Pern H Chia, ‘Interdependent Privacy: Let Me Share Your Data’ in David Hutchison and others (eds), 
Financial Cryptography and Data Security (Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2013); Yu Pu 
and Jens Grossklags, ‘Using Conjoint Analysis to Investigate the Value of Interdependent Privacy in Social App Adoption 
Scenarios: Research Paper presented at the 36th International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015’ (2015) 
2 <http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2015/proceedings/SecurityIS/12/> accessed 22 January 2017. For a similar approach see Bania 
(n 10), 52. 
137  Biczók and Chia (n 136); Pu and Grossklags (n 136) 2. 
138  Green and Srinivasan, ‘Conjoint Analysis in Marketing’ (n 127) 8–9. 
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representative139 sample of consumers would be confronted with a limited number (ideally 12-20)140 of 
paired choice tasks and asked to rank the product profiles according to their preferences by allocating a 
fixed sum of points (e.g. 100 points), across each pair of consumer communications apps so as to indicate 
their preferred product profile.141  
On the basis of the overall utility ranking of different profiles by the respondents, the Commission could 
estimate the utility and relative importance of each attribute and attributive level for the consumers’ 
product choices by means of multi-variable regressions.142 In order to quantify how much consumers 
value privacy levels of consumer communications apps and their changes in monetary terms, the 
competition authority weighs the utility changes in response to variations in the attributive level with 
the utility changes in response to changes in monetary prices. Thus, the competition authority could 
gauge how much consumers are willing to pay for a certain level of a non-price attribute of the product, 
such as privacy.  
The determination of the monetary value of the non-price product characteristic of privacy by means of 
conjoint analysis would have provided the Commission in Facebook/WhatsApp with important 
information for market definition and the theory of harm alike. The conjoint analysis might have 
informed the definition of a ‘data market’ by indicating which change in the level of privacy corresponds 
to a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (usually 5-10% price increase).143 Most 
importantly, the conjoint analysis might have enabled the Commission to quantify the consumer harm 
arising from changes in WhatsApp’s privacy policy. This information could have even been used in 
merger simulations to estimate in monetary terms how different changes in the privacy policy post- 
merger would affect consumer welfare.  
Although the merging parties did not invoke any merger specific efficiencies, the conjoint analysis 
would have also enabled the Commission to balance the consumer harm arising from the decrease in 
privacy with pro-competitive efficiencies. In the event that the invoked efficiencies would not have been 
sufficient to offset the privacy- harm arising from the combination of Facebook’s and WhatsApp’s user 
database, the Commission could have either blocked the merger, or at least imposed commitments to 
prevent potential privacy-related consumer harm. 
V. Potential objections  
My proposal to quantify and balance privacy-related consumer harm by means of conjoint analysis is, 
however, likely to elicit a number of objections. The proposed approach might give rise to general 
concerns about the administrability and reliability of the conjoint analysis as a tool for merger analysis. 
The application of conjoint analysis to privacy, moreover, might entail specific normative and 
methodological issues. 
V.1 Administrability and reliability  
The proposal to use the conjoint analysis as a tool for merger analysis may be met by concerns about its 
complexity and methodological shortcomings which might affect its reliability and administrability. 
Arguably, the results of conjoint analysis are, like the outcomes of other survey-based methods, heavily 
                                                   
139  n = ideally around 1000, the sample should represent different age and population groups and should be composed by 
existing and future consumer communications app users. 
140  Determination of Rates and Terms for Digital Performance in Sound Recording and Ephemeral Recording (WEB IV) - 
Testimony of Daniel McFadden (n 132) [16]. 
141  Baker and Rubinfeld (n 132), 425. 
142  Pu and Grossklags (n 136) 9. 
143  For the use of conjoint analysis for market definition see Hildebrand (n 132), 327–334. 
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contingent upon the way the questions or choice tasks are framed. Hence, one may object that the use 
of conjoint analysis bears the risk of undermining the administrability and legal certainty of merger 
enforcement. In this respect, however, it is important to note that competition authorities on both sides 
of the Atlantic have gained considerable experience with complex econometric, empirical and survey-
based methods in particular in the context of merger control.144 The economic literature has also devised 
solutions to improve the design of conjoint analysis and enhance its administrability and reliability.145  
This might explain why willingness to pay studies and conjoint analysis have, as shown in Table 2, 
developed a considerable track record in competition and copyright cases.146 The recurrent use of 
conjoint analysis merger cases suggests that conjoint analysis constitutes a workable and administrable 
tool which can be put into play despite the tight deadlines and time constraints competition authorities 
have to cope with in phase I and phase II merger reviews. 
Table 2 - Use of conjoint analysis in competition-related cases147 
Case Subject matter Product Methodology Sample size 
NMa Ziekenhuis 
Hilversum/Ziekenhuis Gooi-
Nord (2005, case 3897) 
Merger Quality of healthcare Conjoint value Not reported 
NMa Bloemenveiling 
Aalsmeer/FloraHolland (2007, 
case 5901) 
Merger Flower auctions 
(after sale services) 
Choice- based 2000 growers 
700 buyers 
NMa (Dutch Competition 
Authority ) Aggrifirm/Cehave 
(2010a, case 6781) 
Merger Artificial fertilizers  Choice-based 1600 
NMa Nordic Capital/ 
Handicare (2010b, case 6900) 
Merger Powered wheelchairs Choice-based 39 dealers 
NMa Continental Bakeries/ 
A.A. ter Beek (2012, case 
7321) 
Merger Rusk and breakfast 
cake 
Choice-based 1402  
ACM (Dutch Competition 
Authority) SENS – SNS 
(2015, case 15.0783.24) 
Merger Games of chance Adaptive choice-based 
conjoint analysis 
2000 
ACM Chicken of tomorrow 
(2015, case 13.0195.66) 
101 (1) and (3) 
TFEU 
Broiler  Choice-based 1600 
                                                   
144  Daniel Zimmer and Ulrich Schwalbe, Law and Economics in European Merger Control (Oxford University Press 2009) 
202–220; Hurley (n 130). 
145  Abba M Krieger and Paul E Green, ‘Designing Pareto Optimal Stimuli for Multiattribute Choice Experiments’ (1991) 2(4) 
Marketing Letters 337 342–344; Hann, Hui and others (n 99), 22; Green, Krieger and Wind (n 128), 57; Green and 
Srinivasan, ‘Conjoint Analysis in Marketing’ (n 127) 8; Imthorn, Kemp and Nobel (n 130) 11. 
146  De la Mano, Miguel, Enrico Pesaresi and Oliver Stehman, ‘Econometric and survey evidence in the competitive assessment 
of the Ryanair-Aer Lingus merger’ (2007). Competition Merger Brief 3; Baker and Rubinfeld (n 132); Rubinfeld (n 132); 
Determination of Rates and Terms for Digital Performance in Sound Recording and Ephemeral Recording (WEB IV) - 
Testimony of Daniel McFadden (n 132); Dutch Competition Authority (ACM) (n 132); Hurley (n 130); Imthorn, Kemp 
and Nobel (n 130) 13. 
147  This table is based on Hurley (n 130); Imthorn, Kemp and Nobel (n 130). 
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UK Competition Commission 
Sportech/Vernons (2007) 
Merger Football pools Adaptive choice-based 1654 
US Copyright Royalty Board 
– WEB IV (2015) 
Determination of 
rates and terms 
for digital 
performance in 
sound recordings 
and ephemeral 
recordings 
Features of Music 
Streaming Services 
Choice-based 983 
With regard to potential concerns about the reliability of conjoint analysis, it is also important to point 
out that conjoint analysis has been specifically developed in order to address the methodological 
shortcomings of stated preference surveys. While stated preference surveys based on hypothetical ‘what-
if questions’ are often subject to biases and likely to overstate customers’ price sensitivity,148 the conjoint 
analysis seeks to mimic a realistic market environment by confronting participants with product 
choices.149 The use of conjoint analysis to assess consumers’ willingness to pay for privacy would thus 
also allow competition authorities to account for the so-called ‘privacy paradox’.150 This paradox results 
from the discrepancy between consumers’ stated preferences and revealed behaviour with regard to 
privacy. By testing consumers’ revealed behaviour rather than their stated preferences, conjoint analysis 
hence provides competition authorities with a more reliable tool than other survey methods to identify 
consumers’ willingness to pay for privacy. Of course, the design and results of the conjoint analysis 
must be tested and the conjoint analysis cannot be the sole element on which a merger decision is to be 
based.151 Nonetheless, it would be an important methodological tool which would complement existing 
merger analysis and would allow it to identify privacy-related consumer harm. 
V.2 Specific normative and methodological concerns about the application of conjoint analysis to 
privacy 
Beyond general concerns regarding the administrability and reliability of conjoint analysis, its specific 
application to privacy might, however, also give rise to normative and methodological objections. Based 
on normative grounds, opponents to such an approach might argue that the use of conjoint analysis, 
which conceptualizes privacy as price, unduly commodifies the fundamental right to data protection. 
Assuming the rationality of consumers’ choices, conjoint analysis also sits uneasily with insights from 
behavioural economics. With regard to privacy, behavioural economics point out that, far from being 
rational, users’ privacy decisions are often fraught by information asymmetries and cognitive biases that 
prevent them from assessing the actual costs of their information disclosure.152 From this perspective, 
relying on conjoint analysis in order to address privacy-related consumer harm through the application 
of competition law is simply an insufficient or wrong tool to address the market failures surrounding 
informational privacy and to protect the fundamental right to data protection. Better designed and 
                                                   
148  Daniel McFadden, ‘Economic Choices’ (2001) 91(3) American Economic Review 351 364; OECD, ‘Exploring the 
Economics of Personal Data’ (n 126) 30. 
149  Green, Krieger and Wind (n 128), 61; Imthorn, Kemp and Nobel (n 130) 11; Hurley (n 130), 63. 
150  Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte and George Loewenstein, ‘Privacy and human behavior in the age of information’ 
(2015) 347(6221) Science 509 510; Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross, ‘Information Revelation and Privacy in Online 
Social Networks’ (2005). ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society; Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Digital markets, data, 
and privacy: Competition law, consumer law, and data protection’ . ZWB Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 
14-2016 6; Dinev and Hart Paul (n 98), 61. 
151  Imthorn, Kemp and Nobel (n 130) 25. 
152  Acquisti, Brandimarte and Loewenstein (n 150), 510; Daniel J Solove, ‘Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the 
Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126(1881) Harvard Law Review 1883–1888. 
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reinforced data protection rules constitute the only way to correct these market failures and guarantee 
the fundamental right to data protection. 
 
Graph 1 - The relation between privacy as a non-monetary price and data protection 
These normative and methodological objections against the use of conjoint analysis as a tool to translate 
privacy into monetary prices thus ultimately converge in the conclusion that competition law is the 
wrong forum to address privacy concerns. Akin to the predominant view amongst antitrust scholars, 
which this study tries to refute, both positions assume that data protection regulation constitutes the 
better institutional alternative to protect privacy as a fundamental right, and to address market failures 
and cognitive biases that compromise individual privacy choices. All three potential criticisms share the 
common assumption that the privacy-price approach seeks to use or instrumentalize competition law in 
order to fix regulatory failures resulting from insufficient or dysfunctional data protection legislation.153  
This argument, however, misconceives the respective roles of competition law and data protection 
regulation, which remain distinct, even if competition law accounts for privacy-related consumer harm. 
The current debate on the role of privacy for competition analysis often simply ignores that firms can 
lower the level of privacy protection, and thus raise the privacy-price consumers have to pay for their 
services without necessarily violating data protection legislation. This is reflected in Graph 1, which 
shows that the rise in privacy-price (depicted as a shift from the competitive privacy-price Pc to the 
monopoly privacy-price Pm) does not necessarily exceed the maximum privacy-price set by data 
protection rules (Pdata protection in Graph 1). Indeed, data protection regulation operationalizes the 
fundamental right of data protection by defining a minimum level of protection beyond which the level 
of privacy may not be lowered. In the terminology of the ‘privacy calculus’ this minimum level of 
protection establishes a price cap or maximum privacy-price (Pdata protection) that companies may legally 
impose on their customers. This minimum level of protection is in general translated into specific 
                                                   
153  Manne and Sperry, ‘The Problems and Perils of Bootstrapping Privacy and Data into an Antitrust Framework’ (n 11); 
Franck (n 112), 143–144. 
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consumer or data protection rules, which define the legal framework within which consumers trade-off 
their privacy against free online services. 
There is little doubt that EU competition law applies to anticompetitive practices even if they are in 
compliance with, for instance, consumer protection laws or sector-specific regulation.154 By the same 
token, the proposed privacy-price approach price might address consumer harm resulting from decreases 
in the level of privacy as a consequence of a merger or business conduct, although it does not necessarily 
violate privacy rules. The concept of privacy-price and its operationalization through conjoint analysis 
thus provides for a compelling consumer welfare argument as to why competition law should account 
for privacy as a non-monetary price in data-driven markets, where personal data is bartered in 
accordance with the conditions and below what one can call a ‘price ceiling’ (Pdata protection in Graph 1) 
defined by data protection regulation.  
This understanding of the role of competition law in addressing privacy-related consumer harm is also 
in line with the EU courts’ case law. The Court of Justice and General Court unequivocally held that 
EU competition law, like EU primary law, applies even in sectors that are subject to sector-specific 
regulation.155 Moreover, the EU Commission also recently stressed in Microsoft/LinkedIn that even 
though the existing156 and future EU data protection frameworks157 restrict the merged entity’s capacity 
to access and process data, competition law nonetheless applies to any anticompetitive effect that might 
arise from the merging firms’ lawful attempts to access or combine their datasets in compliance with 
data protection rules.158  
In my view, the assumption that any decrease in privacy protection automatically entails a violation of 
data protection rules constitutes the fundamental ‘privacy fallacy’ that misleads the current discussion 
on the role of privacy for competition law. The proposed privacy-price approach debunks the 
fundamental misconception which underlies the predominant view that privacy should not be accounted 
for under competition law analysis. It advances an economically sound argument why, and sets out how 
competition law should address changes in privacy protection resulting from mergers and business 
conduct that do not breach data protection rules. To be clear, the proposed privacy-price approach and 
its operationalization through conjoint analysis does not represent a panacea that will correct all market 
failures and behavioural biases surrounding consumers’ privacy choices; these can only be addressed 
by better-designed data protection regulations. Rather, it constitutes an appropriate tool to address the 
consumer harm that materializes within the framework that data protection establishes for non-monetary 
online transactions and thus updates competition law analysis for the digital era. 
                                                   
154  See for  instance Court of Justice of the EU Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 [80] 
- [96]. 
155  ibid. General Court of the European Union Case T-398/07 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:173 [55]. The EU Court 
of Justice has also repeatedly clarified that the (non-)compliance with existing national or EU regulation can constitute an 
important reference point for the competitive analysis of certain practices Case C-32/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító and 
Others (n 123) [46] - [47]. Court of Justice of the European Union Case C-457/10P AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc 
v European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2012:770 [74] - [75], [93]. Court of Justice of the European Union Case C-179/16 F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:25 [92] - [93]. 
156  European Union, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection 
of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on The Free movement of Such Data. [1995] O.J. L 
281/31. 
157  European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC, General Data Protection Regulation. [2016] OJ L 119/1. 
158  
Case COMP/M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn (n 26) [177] - [179], [255], [375]. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The present study challenges conventional antitrust wisdom by arguing in favour of a more prominent 
role of privacy in merger analysis. It shows that while competition authorities increasingly account for 
the role of personal data as a potential source of market power and entry barriers, privacy still constitutes 
a major blind spot in current merger analysis. To address this analytical lacuna, the study discusses three 
potential privacy-related theories of harm that would enable competition authorities to integrate 
potential consumer harm arising from a decrease in privacy protection into their merger assessment. 
Whereas the literature and competition authorities have so far framed privacy harm either as 
deterioration of product quality or restriction of consumer choice, this study shows how the proposition 
that privacy constitutes the real price consumers pay for free online services can be operationalized in 
merger analysis.  
The intuition that a decrease in privacy is tantamount to an increase of monetary prices does not only 
inform merger control by providing an adequate proxy for market definition in zero price online markets, 
but also constitutes a solid economic basis for identifying privacy-related consumer harm. Illustrating 
that not every decrease in privacy policy necessarily amounts to a breach of data protection rules, this 
study also reveals that the opposition of orthodox antitrust scholarship and competition authorities to a 
more important role of privacy in antirust analysis is grounded in a ‘privacy fallacy’. This fallacy 
erroneously assumes that a decrease in the level of privacy protection automatically constitutes a breach 
of data protection rules and is therefore better sanctioned by privacy regulators. 
As a major contribution, this study contends that willingness-to-pay studies in the form of conjoint 
analysis constitute a valuable methodological toolkit to measure privacy-related price increases that 
would enable merger analysis to identify consumer harm resulting from a decrease in privacy protection. 
The proposed privacy-price approach thus not only explains ‘whether’ but also ‘how’ privacy 
considerations could be integrated in merger control. It thus suggests what lessons are to be drawn from 
the Facebook/WhatsApp saga. Integrating privacy into the edifice of antitrust analysis is a necessary 
step to keep merger control abreast to the challenges of the digital economy lest consumers continue to 
receive messages similar to those they discovered on their cell-phones in the aftermath of the 
Facebook/WhatsApp merger.  
  
 
 
